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INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND
REGULATION IN THE NETHERLANDS
AND UNITED STATES: SOME
COMPARATIVE REFLECTIONS
Sigmund Timberg t
Mr. Balkenstein's paper supplies a clear and objective description
of the relative roles played by industry associations and labor groups
and by the national government, respectively, in the regulation of
Netherlands industry. The basic issue raised by this paper-the
distribution of regulatory power in the modem state between private
groups and a central government-is one of the most important,
delicate and continually perplexing problems in the whole domain of
political science.
It seems fair to conclude that the Dutch confer upon their private
business and labor groups powers of decision-making and self-regulation
which we in this country would regard as politically undesirable and
economically unwise. Not only are private agreements to restrict
competition not forbidden, but the Netherlands Government has the
power to make such an agreement binding on an entire industry, if so
requested and if it finds the agreement compatible with the public
interest. (p. 505). A nominally advisory, but in practice controlling
influence over major questions of national economic and social policy
is exercised by an Economic and Social Council of forty-five members,
one-third appointed by designated industry organizations, one-third
appointed by designated labor organizations, and one-third appointed
by the government for their expert knowledge. Once the adminis-
tration in power and the Council agree on a program, in Mr. Balken-
stein's words, "rejection by the Parliament is only possible under very
special circumstances." (pp. 510, 513). Also, commodity and industry
boards, composed entirely of business and labor representatives, have
been established covering twenty-five per cent of the national production
and endowed with the power to regulate specified aspects of the
production and marketing of commodities, including conditions of
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sale, wages, the quality of products and (thus far apparently in rare
cases) prices and methods of cost accounting. (p. 521).
This paper will first enumerate some social and political beliefs
which we in the United States have in common with the Dutch, and
then indulge in a brief reminder of the fact that we too have on
occasion relegated the control of our economy to private industry
groups and businesses. It will conclude with a somewhat rash effort
to set forth some radical differences in the industrial intellectual climate
of the two countries that may serve to explain the different relation-
ships obtaining between business and government.
The Netherlands approach to industrial organization is premised
on the following sociological and political propositions which, at least
in their abstract formulation, would command the support, I think,
of the weight of public opinion in the United States:-
First, there would be agreement with our Dutch friends that pri-
vate groups perform a useful role in any democratic society. (p. 503).
A democratic society, in our scheme of things, is based on the prolifera-
tion of dynamic centers of individual initiative and creativeness, and
a certain amount of cooperative action by business and labor groups
is indispensable for the maintenance of such centers of creative energy.
Political pluralism, the notion that groups less comprehensive than the
State have an important and proper role to play in moulding patterns of
economic and social behavior, is an accepted facet of Anglo-American
political theory. It may be recalled that Von Gierke's profound re-
search into the history and philosophy of corporate groups not only
had a deep influence in England on Barker, Laski and the political
pluralists, but constituted in Germany an intellectual counter-thrust to
the dynastic tendencies of the Prussian State.
Second, we share with Mr. Balkenstein a prima facie attitude of
hostility to more governmental bureaucracy than is absolutely neces-
sary, and a feeling that on the whole industry groups are more
competent than are government bureaus and government experts to
deal with the host of complex and technical issues that confront every
industry. (p. 504).
Third, and concurrently with a continuing hostility to bureaucracy,
both we and the Dutch have abandoned laissez-faire theories of govern-
ment and have come to accept, as inevitable increasing participation
by the government in economic affairs, such as is evidenced in social
security legislation.
Fourth, there would be no significant effort in the United States
to dispute the Dutch thesis that the public interest is paramount over
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the private interests of business and labor groups and combinations,
and that it is the function of government to assert the public interest
where that interest does not coincide with such private interests.
Fifth, the United States industrial climate supports the desirability
of avoiding industrial conflict and promoting as much intelligent co-
operation as possible between business groups and trade unions. Mr.
Balkenstein in his historical exposition assigns a great deal of weight
to the development of collective bargaining procedures between in-
dustry and labor as setting both the precedent and tone for the current
organization of Netherlands industry. (pp. 505-06). In basic es-
sentials, that collective bargaining procedure seems similar to what
has been evolved in the United States, and the call for harmony in
labor relations in this country has been as persistent as it has been
in The Netherlands.
Sixth, both in The Netherlands and in the United States, the
exploitation of the large-scale capital and technological resources
needed for so many modern industrial projects demands a considerable
amount of cooperative and collective effort on the part of industry.
No one who is familiar with the tremendous scope that we in the
United States have given the modern corporation can doubt that we
recognize the need for the at times massive concentration of individual
human efforts and physical resources under a single business manage-
ment. The existence of 5000 trade associations in this country, and
the large pools of patents and other technological resources thrown open
to exploitation by whole industries rather than left as the exclusive
domain of individual companies, are illustrative of the extent to which
American society recognizes the need for industrial collaboration.
Thus, we share with the Dutch common and pervasive thought
patterns with respect to the desirability and necessity of individual
initiative; of the avoidance of unnecessary, and the acceptance of
necessary, governmental intervention in economic affairs; of the
public interest as the controlling test of social policy; of cooperation
between industry and labor; and of collaboration among different
segments of industry.
Despite broad discrepancies between the prevailing abstract notions
of the relationship of government to business and labor groups that
obtain between the two countries, the United States has, either for
considerable periods of time or within special sectors of the economy,
adopted practical approaches to the regulation of its industry that are
the same as those which are present in the current Netherlands setup.
528 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106
In fact, it could be said that, however antithetic the present Nether-
lands scheme for the organization and regulation of industry may
be to our ideals, that scheme represents a carrying out, to a degree
which we would not now approve and in areas where we think it
inappropriate, of tendencies and schools of thought that have been
intermittently reflected in United States industrial society and history.
(pp. 500-01).
History and current events both recall occasions when United
States legislation has given private individuals and industrial groups
a power of public regulation and decision-making closely approximat-
ing that which is envisaged under the current Netherlands scheme.
Thus, under the National Recovery Act (which Mr. Balkenstein re-
minds us was a precedent for the Netherlands legislation (p. 505),
industry groups were permitted to agree not only upon minimum
wages, maximum hours and other conditions of work, but also upon
the allocation of production and marketing quotas, the curtailment of
plant capacity, the suppression of styles and models, the imposition of
mandatory accounting procedures, the fixing of prices, and the forced
abandonment of many competitive practices. Under the Netherlands
Industrial Organization Act, the central government may limit the
regulatory powers which commodity and industry boards may exercise
and reserves the right to post-audit, as it were, their regulations to
see whether they are in accord with the public interest. Under the
NRA Act, there may have been more of an emphasis on a pre-audit.
NRA codes had to be approved by the President and were subject to
criticism by three Advisory Boards representing business, labor and
the consumer, respectively. The recommendations of the Advisory
Boards, if negative and sufficiently forceful, sometimes brought about
a change in the code, and consumer representatives were appointed to
the authorities administering the codes. However, these theoretical
safeguards frequently turned out to have no practical efficacy.
We are now so accustomed to deploring the NRA that we are
perhaps prone to overlook the fact that there still exist vestigial survivals
of that experience. Thus, in the marketing of fruit and vegetable
products, there are scattered over the United States some thirty-five
odd marketing agreements and orders, whereby private producer and
processor groups are able to establish marketing quotas and price
regulations for the products which they produce, process and sell.
The Secretary 'of Agriculture retains a legal right of review and a
theoretical responsibility for seeing to it that these agreements and
orders function in the public interest. However, it would be blinking
the realities of current economic life to regard these agreements and
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orders as basically anything other than the products of industry self-
regulation. Also, it is quite easy to be deceived and over-complacent
about the extent to which the consumer and other public interests are
held in mind in their operation.
Moreover, in the field of transportation, railroad carriers are per-
mitted by the Reed-Bulwinkle Act of 1948 to form and participate in
rate conference bureaus wherein joint rates are fixed by private agree-
ment; and water carriers may, through shipping conferences, agree
upon uniform rates. The subsequent review of the industry action by
the Interstate Commerce Commission or the Maritime Board that has
been legislatively provided for is necessarily nominal in nature. Rating
bureaus consisting of representatives of private insurance companies
have for decades established uniform, industry-wide rates for fire insur-
ance, with only nominal powers of oversight on the part of the state
Superintendents of Insurance; Sherman Act disapprobation of this
situation in the Southeastern Underwriters case of 1944 was removed
by the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945. Industry self-regulation in
the marine insurance field has been exempt from antitrust scrutiny since
the Merchant Shipping Act of 1916. A considerable amount of col-
lective regulatory activity is permitted the National Association of
Securities Dealers under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
Some forty-five of our sovereign states have at one time adopted
legislation authorizing manufacturer or distributors, by a single
contract entered into with one of their customers, to set the price at
which their branded or trademarked products must be resold by all
wholesalers or retailers of the product, regardless of whether those
wholesalers or retailers have agreed to observe the stipulated price.
In about thirteen of these states, courts have held such clauses as
violative of their respective state constitutions, many of which specif-
ically prohibit delegation of legislative power to private groups.
Putting to one side any arguments as to either the desirability or
constitutionality of such fair trade "non-signer" provisions for resale
price maintenance, those state courts which have described the matter
as a delegation of legislative power to private groups are on the
right track as a matter of political analysis. We have in effect delegated
to private individuals-albeit in the limited field of branded and trade-
marked commodities-the legislative power to fix prices.
If our political and sociological ideals are in such large measure
similar to those of the Dutch, and our practice has at certain times and
in certain areas so closely paralleled the Netherlands experience, what,
then, explains the extent to which most of us would find the Dutch
industrial environment distasteful and uncongenial?
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Mr. Balkenstein finds the answer in part in certain philosophical
assumptions which are dominant on the Netherlands scene. It is in
keeping with the modesty and meticulousness of expression that char-
acterizes his entire Article, that he does not claim for the Dutch system
of industrial regulation, or the premises upon which that system is
based, validity for any country other than The Netherlands itself.
I should like to rise to his tantalizing bait by speculating on the
philosophical preconceptions and ideals which have historically con-
ditioned the American industrial scene.
Sociologically, we seem to set a greater store than do the Dutch on
competition as a creator of social values; the countervailing Dutch
emphasis is on cooperation. While we consider cooperation between
different business units to be inevitable in certain areas (e.g., labor
relations, standardization), our prevailing assumption is that industrial
progress and economic development is best assured by tapping the
competitive instincts of the individual businessman-by spurring him
to drive his costs below those of other industry members, to engage in
more effective advertising, to afford his customers better service, to
"invent around" a competitor's patent or process. Excessive habits
of industry collaboration are supposed to supply a protective haven for
technological, production and market laggards, who would otherwise
be reformed into efficiency or eliminated by the purging process of
competition. Similarly, we feel it unfair to expect public officials, any
more than cartel executives, to make the cruel decisions that might
result in removing inefficient or redundant producers or distributors
from the market, and we rely instead on the impersonal competitive
market mechanism. In short, a certain amount of tension and com-
petitive strife is considered a desirable method of massaging our indus-
trial muscles to see that they maintain optimum tautness and tone. Of
course, we also recognize industry situations where violent competitive
exercise might be a crippling phenomenon.
From the standpoint of psychological and ethical theory, our
tradition is closer to the classical outlines of hedonistic utilitarianism;
that of the Dutch verges closer to the standards of rational idealism.
We regard human beings as basically guided by selfish ends-as
motivated by the desire to maximize enjoyments and minimize priva-
tions; believe selfish group pressures to be an inevitable part of the
body economic; and trust in our political and economic institutions to
distill public benefit from private selfishness. Even those of us who
take a more altruistic view of "economic man" 'in general feel that
society must be protected against the predatory minority that might
unreasonably exploit their economic position for self-aggrandizement,
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and feel that such protection is best afforded by the social institution of
the free market than by fallible laws or fallible men.
Not among the least of the selfish aspirations of human nature is
to take things easy, to rest on one's oars. As a prominent English
economist has pointed out, one of the leading rewards of the monopolist
is "the quiet life"; this may at times be even truer of a group of firms
dominating an industry than of the unitary monopolist. Fearful as we
in the United States are of industrial stagnation and retardation, we
therefore prohibit industry groups from agreeing on common price,
production and sales policies, because free competitive choices in those
areas are assumed to promote maximum industrial efficiency and
technological progress. Mr. Balkenstein may not disagree with the
notion that human nature initially approaches industrial problems on
a selfish plane. However, implicit in his approach is the assumption
that, when human beings participate in their industry associations
and government councils and accept group responsibilities, their innate
selfishness tends to be replaced by a more moderate approach, by a
tendency to compromise and, ultimately, by a larger measure of regard
for the public good. (pp. 506-07). We, on the other hand, while
not excluding the optimistic possibility that shafts of public altruism
might occasionally light up the inner spiritual recesses of an individual
association or council member, on the whole cling to the pessimistic
premise that the ordinary business or labor representative might use
his power primarily to satisfy his immediate selfish ends or those of
the organization that he is representing.
This emphasis on competition, and on the selfish pursuit of in-
dividual gain resulting in public benefit, is part of that fluid set of mores
often referred to as the "Protestant Ethic," an ethic which Weber's
and Tawney's brilliant researches have established as the religious
basis of present day capitalism. Mr. Balkenstein indicates that the
Netherlands emphasis on group activity has firm roots in both
Protestant and Catholic religious theory in his country, and un-
doubtedly many of the thinkers and doers of both religions have held
a strong brief for cooperative effort in society. One might well specu-
late, however, whether on the whole the philosophy of competition and
struggle would not find deeper historical roots in the Protestant than
in the Catholic intellectual tradition, with the latter's greater emphasis
on the collaboration of all social classes.
From our basically pessimistic view of individual human nature,
there result one economic, two political and two sociological corollaries.
The economic corrollary is our reliance on the impersonal automatic
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operation of the free competitive market mechanism as the basic method
of reconciling the conflicting selfish interests of private business groups.
This reliance has not in any fundamental way been shaken by the
economists' demonstration that the market mechanism is not as im-
personal and automatic as we had thought, and is inapplicable to certain
large industrial areas. By way of contrast, the reader of Mr. Balken-
stein's Article will, I think, sense a greater predilection in The Nether-
lands than here for government planning and (to use an expressive
French term) the dirigist economy. This is particularly apparent in
the Dutch handling of the problem of inflation, doubtless a much more
serious problem for The Netherlands than for us, because of the
former's greater dependency on foreign trade.
The question then arises as to who shall do whatever planning is
necessary, and this leads us to the first political corollary of the
American pessimistic premise about human nature. Mistrustful as we
are of the individual human's capacity or desire to use economic power
wisely for the general good, we have laid it down as a fundamental
postulate of our economic system that no business group should be
given the power, for any industrial area, to fix prices, limit or allocate
production, exclude new entrants or, to use a catch-all phrase, establish
a "private government" of business. If the exercise of such power is
required in the public interest, that exercise must be in the first in-
stance at the hands of a public authority-either the legislator or some
commission with legislatively-endowed power-responsible directly or
indirectly to the general public. The Netherlands Industrial Organiza-
tion Act makes it possible for a public body to exercise rights of review
over the way in which industry groups exercise regulatory powers;
we proscribe outright any private regulation of industry.
Our second political corollary is a latent prejudice against com-
promise (particularly compromise arrived at out of the public view),
and a sneaking preference for open conflict as the best technique for
resolving economic disputes and establishing a sound economic policy.
No one who has seen the United States political process at work and
observed such economic phenomena as collective labor agreements and
antitrust consent decrees can question the substantial role that negotia-
tion and compromise play on the United States industrial scene. But
the flood of legislative, judicial and administrative struggles in economic
matters indicates a continuing large-scale preference for "slugging
it out in the open," and for trusting, as did the constitutional Founding
Fathers, to the selfish clash of contending factions to produce a social
end-product that is in the best public interest. I think the Economic
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and Social Council so highly regarded in The Netherlands would be
mistrusted in this country.
The Founding Fathers lived in the Eighteenth Century Age of
Enlightenment and took as an article of faith a society in which all con-
tending economic and political factions (at least all that were worth
taking into account) would be equally articulate and well-represented.
Any compromise in the political or economic arena would, it was there-
fore assumed, be one in which all factions would participate. In the
Twentieth Century, we have discovered that this is not so-that, for
example, business groups, or business and labor groups, may com-
promise their private differences at the expense of the consuming
public, and that the consuming public is neither articulate nor well-
organized. This discovery has tempered our original laisseg faire
attitude towards business and labor, and conditioned our legal attitudes
towards restrictive agreements. Having regard to the unprotected
position of the distributors, consumers or others who must deal with
business groups, our law allows less room for collaboration and com-
promise to the trade association representing an entire industry than to
the corporation. For like reasons, we tend to scrutinize more carefully
the activities of those large corporations which dominate their indus-
tries than we do the acts of less powerful corporations.
Relying as Mr. Balkenstein does on the rational element in human
nature, he makes a sociological assumption about the role of informed
public opinion that would, I think, be skeptically viewed by many
United States observers. He speaks of an informed public opinion
as causing interested industry groups to relax their selfish pressures.
(p. 507). In the United States, there have been established a great
number of administrative agencies for the regulation of business, on
the contrary assumption that the general public has no informed opinion
on most industrial problems, and that even legislators and judges do
not have the information that makes them competent to decide com-
mercial and economic issues. Consequently, we tend to regard public
opinion (apart from that of the interested parties) as a cipher in most
cases. Where public opinion does exercise an influence on practical
economic controversies, we think it always a good chance that that
influence is either largely irrational or consciously manipulated by
parties with a direct interest in the outcome of the controversy.
Mr. Balkenstein asserts that the presence of government-appointed
experts on the Economic and Social Council keeps the deliberations of
that body from lapsing into mere negotiations between the employer
and labor members of the Council, and makes the advice of the Council
more than an expression of group interests. (p. 512). Moreover, the
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Council members appointed by the employer and labor groups legally
do not represent those organizations and are expected to vote inde-
pendently of previous instructions or consultations; however, it is
conceded that in practice the Council members generally vote in accord-
ance with the view of the organization that has nominated them.
Rightly or wrongly, I doubt whether the United States observer would
take as much comfort as do the Dutch from the presence of experts
on the Council, particularly in view of the fact, noted by Mr. Balkenstein,
that the consumer is not represented on that body. This, as Mr. Balken-
stein also observes, is a danger, particularly since the deliberations of
the Council are not public. (p. 514).
Having swallowed Mr. Balkenstein's sociological bait in large
intellectual gulps, let me close with a few disclaimers.
First, concepts derive substance and shape from the specific
factual matrix to which they are applied. For example, we are all
prepared to endorse in the abstract the idea of stimulating the initiative
and fostering the cooperation of industry groups. But a lot depends
on what sort of industry group we are talking about. In the United
States political-economic system, we accord greater latitude of initiative
and cooperation to the group constituting the small business corporation
than to the group constituting the large business corporation, and to the
group constituting the large business corporation than to the group
represented by an industry trade association. The Netherlands in-
dustry and commodity board is a super-group of trade associations and
labor unions. Hence, the vesting of the power of economic self-
regulation in such groups would be generally repugnant to the United
States view of things.
Second, I have been indulging in large empirical generalizations
about the conflicting philosophical values that condition the relationship
between government and industry in the United States and The
Netherlands, respectively. In neither country has public policy ever
rejected either of the antithetical concepts discussed in the last section
-- competition v. cooperation; hedonistic utilitarianism v. rational
idealism; the free market v. the planned economy; distrust of privately
exercised power v. its acceptance; conflict v. compromise. What has
happened can be best visualized if we take each conflicting pair of
concepts as the two sides of a parallelogram of social and political
forces. For us, competition, a hedonistic utilitarianism, the free
market, the distrust of power and the beneficial value of conflict, have
been the long side of each parallelogram. For the Dutch, the antithesis
of those concepts has been the long side. And, as always happens
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when two conflicting forces or vectors assert themselves against an
object (be it society or a stone), the result is to move the object along
an entirely different vector and one closer to the stronger force.
Third, as Whitehead has said, any groove of abstraction is bound
to be an inadequate description of reality. This paper, like Mr.
Balkenstein's Article, is largely devoted to the theoretical preconception
with which United States and Netherlands public policy start out.
Whither those policies are tending in practice is quite another matter.
We may be closer together than we think. Thus, on the United States
scene, trade associations and labor unions in practice exercise broader
regulatory powers than the law provides; and, if some of the doctrines
of "workable competition" and "corporate concentrates" are followed,
we shall be tending further in the Dutch direction. On the other hand,
Mr. Balkenstein points out "that neither the [Netherlands] government
nor the [Economic and Social] Council is too inclined to allow the
[commodity and industry] boards to direct their attention primarily
to measures intended to restrict competition." (p. 522); that com-
modity boards have been set up primarily for the "small business" and
agricultural industries; that such boards can at no time prevent entry
into business; and that the power to fix prices is generally refused them.
Fourth, there are dangers in overdoing the sociological approach
to law, economics and even social institutions. I am reminded of
Montesquieu's observation concerning the laws of a nation: "They
should be adapted in such a manner to the people for whom they are
framed that it should be a great chance if those of one nation suit
another." Not to flirt with Montesquieu's thesis is to strangle com-
parative law in its infancy. To become too closely wedded to it is to
stifle comparative law before it achieves maturity. I have therefore,
gallantly but perhaps imprudently, pursued the same intellectual gambit
as has my Dutch colleague.
There are great and obvious differences between the Dutch
economic and social scene and our own--differences that may justify
a different framework of public regulation. But there would also ap-
pear to be a large residuum of economic and psychological problems
that we and the Dutch have in common. In that large residual area,
the Netherlands and the United States will have to make continual
basic choices-whether to accentuate and enlarge the competitive, or
the collaborative, potentialities of the industrial scene. Despite the
somewhat amorphous and self-contradictory performance of business
and government in the two countries, the choice between these two
distinct political and philosophical approaches is both real and impor-
tant to every society.
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